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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to develop a procedure that allows policy makers to make an ex-ante assessment of a 
general compulsory amalgamation policy, providing quantitative indications about the possible financial effects. 
The amalgamation of small municipalities is a widespread practice all over the world. This policy is based on the 
assumption that local public service provision is characterized by economies of scale and economies of scope. 
However, population size is not the only determinant of economies of scale, which depend on many other 
factors. For these reasons, the expected effects of any amalgamation program are uncertain, and ex-post 
empirical analyses are unable to offer unambiguous indications to policy makers since all programs differ. 
After a brief discussion of the relevant issues concerning amalgamation, we present the procedure used to 
simulate the economics and administrative effects of a general compulsory amalgamation policy. The procedure 
is tested with reference to the municipalities of Veneto, a region of Italy and we provide the results of a number 
of simulations under alternative amalgamation policies. The main result is that amalgamation policies based only 
on the a priori rule that small municipalities should merge may be very inefficient because the expenditure 
reduction following an amalgamation policy may depend to a considerable extent on other territorial and socio-
economic characteristics of the municipalities involved. 
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1 Introduction 
Municipal amalgamation is a widespread practice all over the world.1 The key driver of this 
policy is the assumption that local public service provision is characterized by economies of 
scale and scope, meaning that a reduction in per capita expenditure or a lower tax and debt 
burden can be realized by amalgamating small municipalities. However, this argument has 
many shortcomings.  
A number of empirical studies, such as by Breunig and Rocaboy (2008), Solé-Ollé and Bosh 
(2005) and Bonisch et al. (2011), confirm the existence of a U-shaped municipal per capita 
expenditure curve.2 Others such as Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) and Gimenez and Prior 
(2007) conclude that municipal efficiency increases almost linearly with population size.3 In 
contrast, the study by Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) suggests that small municipalities are 
more efficient.4 These contrasting results are not entirely driven by the different socio-
economic contexts examined, as they also reflect the different techniques and methods used in 
the analyses.  
However, the key criticism of the standard approach to amalgamation is that population size 
is not the sole determinant of economies of scale, which depend on many other factors.5 For 
these reasons, a vast amalgamation program involving only small and preconceived 
municipalities may prove unsatisfactory, since it could result in an increase in public 
expenditure. 
The effects of municipal amalgamation are usually evaluated after the amalgamation and, 
even in this case, empirical analysis is unable to offer unambiguous statements to policy 
makers.  
                                                
1 For a review of international experience, see Fox and Gurley (2006). A recent overview of amalgamation and 
financial sustainability in local government is available in two special issues of Public Finance and Management 
(Vol. 13, Nos. 2 and 3, 2013, guest editors Brian Dollery and Bligh Grant), which collects many contributions 
from all over the world. Others recent contributions about Europe are collected in a special issue of Local 
Government Studies (Vol. 36, No. 2, 2010). 
2 The study by Breunig and Rocaboy (2008) refers to French municipalities, and was based on a multiple 
regression model and a semi-parametric technique. The optimal municipal dimension was 400 inhabitants only. 
Solé-Ollé and Bosh (2005) analyzed Spanish municipalities by means of a piecewise linear model, and found 
that per capita expenditure is minimum at 5,000 inhabitants. Using DEA, Bonisch et al. (2011) analyzed 
municipal expenditure in Saxony-Anhalt. Their results show that the most efficient municipalities are those with 
a population size of about 8,000.   
3 Sampaio de Sousa et al. (2005) analyzed the efficiency of Brazilian municipalities. Gimenez and Prior (2007) 
investigated Spanish municipalities. 
4 The existence of a positive linear relationship between efficiency and population size can be attributed to a 
number of preliminary assumptions. In examining the expenditure behavior of 353 Finnish municipalities, 
Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) excluded municipalities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, and omitted general 
administration costs, which are usually more subject to economies of scale. 
5 See Andrews et al. (2002). 
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This paper develops a procedure that allows policy makers to make an ex-ante assessment of 
a general compulsory amalgamation program, giving them quantitative indications of the 
possible financial and administrative effects of such a program. The method is case-specific, 
since it is elaborated on the basis of the specific institutional, financial and structural 
characteristics of the local administrations to be amalgamated. 
Since population size cannot be considered as the only parameter that triggers the 
amalgamation procedure, a number of alternative amalgamation policies must be defined in 
order to implement an amalgamation program. These policies will represent a crucial part of 
the analysis. 
For each amalgamation policy, the proposed procedure will provide indications of the 
expected administrative impacts of the reform, in terms of the number and size of the local 
administrations involved in the amalgamation program.  
However, the main purpose of the procedure is to assess the expected financial impact of the 
program, evaluated in terms of expenditure reduction. This task involves not only estimating a 
municipal expenditure function, but also defining spatial relationships between municipalities, 
the amalgamation criteria used by policy makers and, in particular, the method used to 
compute the expected financial gain. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we discuss the key questions that 
justify the ex-ante assessment of municipal amalgamation and explain our reason for 
concentrating on compulsory amalgamations. The procedure used to simulate the economic 
and administrative effects of a compulsory amalgamation policy is presented in the third 
section. In Sections 4 and 5, we estimate an expenditure function and discuss the presence of 
economies of scale in the municipalities of the Veneto Region, located in northeast Italy, and 
report the results of simulations carried out using four alternative amalgamation policies.  
2 The expected impacts of municipal amalgamations: the relevant issues 
2.1 From voluntary to compulsory amalgamations 
Oates’s fundamental study on decentralization highlighted the importance of preference 
heterogeneity in determining the optimal local government dimension (Oates, 1972). In a 
heterogeneous context, the higher the concern about democracy and compliance with local 
preferences, the lower the optimal government dimension will be. The relevance of this aspect 
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appears to be clear, considering the huge fragmentation of local government that occurred in 
many Central and Eastern European countries after 1990.6  
A policy that encourages voluntary amalgamations provides compliance with local 
preferences and the success of the initiative. Hanes and Wikström (2010) showed that 
voluntary amalgamations in Sweden proved to be more efficient than compulsory 
amalgamations. Even the Local Government Association of Queensland (Dollery et al., 2013, 
page 226) stressed the importance of the voluntary nature of any amalgamation proposal for 
its ultimate success. 
However, due to the presence of strong differences in local identities, voluntary 
amalgamations are not easy to realize, even in the presence of economies of scale. In Italy, for 
example, where the recent federalist wave has stressed the importance of local autonomy, 
only a few amalgamations occurred in the last twenty years, despite the fact that national 
legislation provides strong incentives for voluntary amalgamations. Pirani (2012) showed that 
only nine municipal amalgamations have taken place in Italy since 1995, involving just 24 
municipalities out of a total of more than 8,000.  
The use of public resources to promote voluntary amalgamation is another questionable point. 
Even assuming that these incentives are effective, they represent a net loss of welfare for the 
population not involved in amalgamation, since all of the benefits will be enjoyed by only the 
residents of amalgamated municipalities. 
Structural reforms of local government based on voluntary amalgamations are difficult to 
govern and the expected economic impact of such reforms is essentially unpredictable 
because it is difficult to predict which municipalities will actually merge. A number of 
attempts to solve this problem can be found in Sorensen (2005), who analyzed the Norwegian 
case, Miyazaki (2013), who considered the situation in Japan, and Dur and Staal (2007), who 
based their study on a theoretical model. In any case, the authors stressed the importance of 
the expected efficiency gains and the fact that the results may not be generalized to other 
countries.7 
                                                
6 Since 1990, with increasing attention being paid to local autonomy, there has been a strong territorial 
fragmentation in the local administrations of many Central and Eastern European countries, where the number of 
municipalities increased between 107% and 472% within the space of a few years. See Swianiewicz (2010). 
7 Miyazaki (2013) analyzed voluntary amalgamation decisions taken by municipalities in Japan and showed, 
using data from local referendums on consolidation, that the expected “efficiency gains from consolidation are 
one of the key impetus for deciding to merge”. He also found that voluntary amalgamations are likely to be 
realized between large and small municipalities, and if unconditional grants are low. Sorensen (2005) found that 
consolidation is more likely to occur when the efficiency gains are large. Although these gains are greater in 
small municipalities, these administrations are often prepared to sacrifice some efficiency gain to remain 
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A reform of local administrations based on voluntary amalgamations appears to be an optimal 
strategy if the aim is to improve local autonomy and to guarantee an increase in local social 
welfare. In this case, the distribution of benefits among local populations is an essential part 
of the amalgamation decision. However, if the main aim of the reform is to improve public 
financial viability, this strategy is likely to fail.  
2.2 The impact of amalgamation: the need for an ex-ante assessment 
Numerous quantitative analyses examine the impact of municipal amalgamations on current 
expenditure.8 Focusing on Australia’s considerable experience of compulsory amalgamations, 
Dollery et al. (2013) rejected amalgamation as a means of generating greater financial 
sustainability in local governments. This result can be attributed to the absence of scale and 
scope economies, to high transitional costs and to the presence of constraints on the revenue-
raising side. Slack and Bird (2013) considered the amalgamation of municipalities in the 
Toronto area. Mainly due to the specific case considered, the economic effects are 
unsatisfactory because cost reductions were small and transitional costs were higher than 
expected. Reid (2013) analyzed the local government reform that has been taking place in 
New Zealand since 1946, and found that the amalgamation strategy was strongly driven by 
considerations involving efficiency and effectiveness only in recent years.  
Transitional costs, either concerning municipal direct financial costs or monetary and time 
costs for populations, must be properly assessed during amalgamation. In some cases, such as 
in England and Wales, efficiency gains due to amalgamations do not seem to be high enough 
to outweigh the costs involved (Rhys, 2013).9 Transitional costs and expenditure reduction 
cannot, however, be compared directly because the former occur only once, while the latter 
recurs every year. For this reason, a proper discounted cash flow method must be applied. 
Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) analyzed the amalgamation process in Finland and found that the 
larger municipal size obtained by merging small municipalities did not reduce per capita 
expenditure, mainly because expenditure increased in a number of categories, such as 
                                                                                                                                                   
independent polities. Dur and Staal (2007) demonstrated that, in the presence of spillovers, if a large and a small 
municipality decide to consolidate, the smaller one will continue to suffer from an underprovision of public 
goods. Village inhabitants have insufficient incentives to vote for consolidation, but national government can 
solve this problem using an appropriate transfer scheme. 
8 Some authors consider the impact on tax rates and debt. To find out what affects debt burden see, in particular, 
Park (2013), whose econometric analysis refers to consolidated governments in South Korea. Park concludes 
that municipal amalgamations should not be implemented in order to achieve financial sustainability in terms of 
debt management, as consolidation may be associated with an increase in the debt burden. 
9 As the author underlined, the results may depend on the specific amalgamation process carried out in England, 
which took the form of a vertical consolidation. In Italy, many amalgamations essentially failed to gain popular 
consensus because of the high perceived transitional costs. 
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education and health care. Reingewertz (2012) studied the economic impact of an Israeli 
amalgamation reform in 2003 and found that, on the contrary, this process led to an 
approximately 9% decrease in municipal expenditure.10  
These results are largely case specific and cannot be generalized to other institutional 
contexts, meaning that ex-post analyses are of limited benefit for policy purposes, therefore 
the ex-ante analysis of a planned amalgamation may be a useful tool for policy makers.  
An ex-ante evaluation of a compulsory amalgamation reform was conducted by Iommi 
(2013a, 2013b) with respect to Tuscany’s municipalities. Using a simple procedure she 
estimated that the reform could lead to savings of € 96 million per year (-11% compared to 
the current level) due to the avoidance of bureaucracy costs, in addition to € 65 million per 
year for foregone costs of political bodies.11 
3 A procedure for the ex-ante assessment of a general compulsory amalgamation policy 
Let us assume that, in order to reduce municipalities’ expenditure, policy makers decide to 
carry out a structural reform of the local government based on a general compulsory 
amalgamation policy. 
The ex-ante assessment of this policy can be implemented using a procedure based on the 
knowledge of the followings points: 
a) the existing spatial relationships between municipalities. Given the initial set of M 
municipalities, MΛ , spatial relationships are defined by a square matrix W (of order M) in 
which each row and each column represents a municipality. The generic element ijw  of the 
matrix is equal to 1 if municipalities i and j are adjoining and equal to zero otherwise. 
b) the socio-economic characteristics of each municipality. Exogenous data is represented by 
a matrix X of dimension KM × , whose element kix ,  indicates the value of variable k 
( Kk ,...,1= ) for municipality i ( Mi ,...,1= ); 
c) the municipalities’ expenditure behavior. The actual per capita expenditure of the i-th 
municipality, iE , can be written as the sum of iEˆ , the expected per capita expenditure of the 
i-th municipality, and a residual, iεˆ , which measures the i-th municipality’s peculiarities: 
                                                
10 Reingewertz (2012) also found that the impact on total revenues was very low and not highly statistically 
significant, whereas the impact on debt was large (+12%), but not significant. 
11 Iommi’s basic hypotheses are: a) municipalities merge until the new municipal boundaries coincide with the 
boundaries of higher level administrations; b) per capita expenditure of a new administration is equal to the 
average value of the present administration of the same size. However, the method used is of little use in 
designing new administrative boundaries and is limited by the assumption that a municipal‘s population size 
alone affects per capita expenditure. 
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 iiiKiii ExxE εε ˆˆˆ),...( ,1, +=+Γ=  (1) 
The estimated expenditure function ),...( 1 KxxΓ  represents average municipal behavior. 
d) the amalgamation policy used by policy makers. Any amalgamation policy can be seen as 
a way of transforming the original set of municipalities MΛ  into a new set, NΛ , which 
includes a smaller number of municipalities ( MN < ). A policy consists of a set of criteria 
and constraints that allow policy makers to identify municipalities that could be amalgamated 
and those that are convenient to amalgamate.  
e) the method used to compute the expected expenditure reduction. Ex post, the gain 
resulting from the amalgamation between municipalities i and j is, by definition, the 
difference between the sum of actual expenditures of municipalities i and j and the 
expenditure of the new municipality ij  formed by the amalgamation: 
 ijjijjiiij POPEPOPEPOPES −+= , (2) 
where iPOP  and jPOP  are the populations of the original administrations, while ijE  and 
jiij POPPOPPOP +=  are the per capita expenditure and population of the amalgamated 
municipality ij , respectively. However, before proceeding with the amalgamations, the value 
of ijS  in equation (2) cannot be computed since term ijE  is unknown. In order to solve the 
problem, we must first consider the fact  that, by equation (1), ijijij EE εˆˆ += . Furthermore, 
since the amalgamated municipality will inherit all of the characteristics of the original 
municipalities, the residual ijεˆ  will necessarily depend on the original municipalities’ 
residuals. We assume that ijεˆ  is an average of those residuals, weighted by population: 
 ijjjiiij POPPOPPOP /)ˆˆ(ˆ εεε += . (3) 
It follows that: 
 ijjjiiijij POPPOPPOPEE /)ˆˆ(ˆ εε ++= , (4) 
and substituting into (2) we obtain: 
 ijjijjiiij POPEPOPEPOPES ˆˆˆ −+= . (5) 
The relevant aspect of equation (5) is that the expenditure reduction can be computed ex ante 
on the basis of the expected per capita expenditures of the municipalities involved. 
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The value of ijEˆ  in equation (5) is computed under two hypotheses: 
• the behavior of municipalities does not change after amalgamation, meaning that the 
estimated expenditure function ),..,,...,( ,,1, nijkijij xxxΓ  is also applicable to the new municipality; 
• the values of all explanatory variables of the new municipality kijx ,  are derived directly 
from those of the original municipalities. In many cases, ex-post values (e.g. the number of 
inhabitants or the land area) are just the sum of the original values. In other cases, post-
amalgamation values are averages of the original data, weighted by population. In aggregate, 
exogenous variables remain unchanged. 
With the previous information and hypotheses, the expected financial impact of a compulsory 
amalgamation policy can be computed using the iterative procedure represented in Figure 1, 
which considers the amalgamation of a couple of municipalities in each iteration. The 
procedure follows the steps below: 
• Step 1: identification of all potential amalgamations on the basis of data matrix X, spatial 
matrix W and the amalgamation policy adopted; 
• Step 2: if the set of potential amalgamation is not empty, the procedure continues, 
otherwise it stops; 
• Step 3: the best amalgamation is chosen according to the policy criteria (e.g. 
amalgamation ij between municipalities i and j); 
• Step 4: data matrix X and spatial matrix W are updated, adding the new municipality ij 
and removing i and j. As a consequence, the number of municipalities decreases by one at 
each iteration; 12 
• Step 5: the expected per capita expenditures iEˆ , jEˆ  and ijEˆ  are computed by means of 
the estimated expenditure function. The expenditure reduction ijS  is then computed using 
equation (5). 
The iterative procedure stops when all potential aggregations have been exploited.13 The main 
outputs of the procedure are the expected expenditure reduction generated by each 
amalgamation and the total amount of expenditure reduction that can be achieved from the 
amalgamation program, TS .
14  
                                                
12 A newly formed municipality can be aggregated to other municipalities in subsequent iterations. 
13 The computer code was written using the package R (R Development Core Team, 2011). 
14 Total expenditure reduction does not include transitional costs, which are not considered at this stage. It can be 
demonstrated that the expected expenditure reduction generated by an amalgamation involving many 
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Figure 1 – Iterative procedure for the ex-ante assessment of a general compulsory 
amalgamation program 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
municipalities is invariant with respect to the way and the order in which municipalities aggregate with one 
another, i.e. if they consolidate progressively two by two or all together simultaneously. 
(Iteration t=1,…,M-N) 
Initial information 
- Amalgamation policy 
- Initial set of M municipality ΛM 
- Data matrix X (M×K) 
- Spatial matrix W (M×M) 
Step 1 
Identify potential 
amalgamations 
Step 2 
Are more 
amalgamations 
possible? 
Step 3 
Choose municipalities i and j that 
form the “best” amalgamation ij 
Step 4 
• Compute vector xij for the new municipality 
• Update matrix X and W with M-t municipalities 
Step 5 
Compute: 
• Estimated expenditure Ȇij=Γ(xij,1,…, xij,K) 
• Expected expenditure reduction Sij 
Stop 
Main outputs: 
• Final set of municipalities ΛN 
• New matrix X (N×K) 
• New matrix W (N×N) 
• Vector of expected expenditure 
reductions Sij and total reduction ST 
yes 
no 
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4 An application to Veneto Region Municipalities 
4.1 The initial set of municipalities 
The procedure presented in paragraph 3 was tested considering the 581 municipalities of the 
Veneto Region, situated in northeast Italy with the regional capital of Venice. The basic data 
set X includes all relevant variables that describe the financial, economic and social 
characteristics of each municipality in 2010.15 A number of general characteristics of these 
municipalities are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix. The average population size 
is 8,499 inhabitants; 6.9% of municipalities have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, 53.9% have 
under 5,000 inhabitants and 97% have fewer than 30,000 inhabitants. The high fragmentation 
of municipalities makes the Veneto Region an interesting case study in order to assess the 
effects of a structural reform based on a compulsory amalgamation program. 
4.2 The municipal expenditure function 
In specifying the expenditure function )(xΓ , a crucial role was assigned to the institutional 
context. The expenditure behavior of Italian municipalities is in fact expected to present 
structural breaks with respect to population size. The first break is due to the Domestic 
Stability Pact (DSP), which was applied in 2010 to only municipalities with more than 5,000 
inhabitants. Other breaks concern municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, which 
have always been subject to specific legislation, and the seven provincial capitals due to the 
particular services they have to provide.16 Figure 2 shows the relationship between per capita 
expenditure and population for Veneto Region municipalities.17  
                                                
15 The authors wish to thank the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) for providing data on 
municipalities, particularly concerning spatial matrix W. 
16 It is worth noting that, in 2010, municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants were forced to supply certain 
public services in association with other municipalities. For this reason, we will consider the per capita 
expenditure of such associations as a determinant of the municipal per capita expenditure. 
17 In order to highlight the particularities of small municipalities, Figure 2 shows only municipalities with fewer 
than 30,000 inhabitants. A simple relationship between per capita expenditure and population size is shown by 
the fitted line computed using a simple quadratic function of log population (see Table A.3 in Appendix). 
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Figure 2 – Veneto Region municipalities: per capita expenditure and population  
 (year 2010) 
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Due to the presence of structural breaks, the expenditure function was specified as follows:  
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1
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352110ln , (6) 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of per capita current expenditure. Terms 1d  
and 5d  are two dummy variables that indicate, respectively, municipalities with fewer than 
1,000 inhabitants ( id1 =1) and with between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants ( id5 =1). The term 
iprov  is a dummy variable that indicates whether the municipality is a provincial capital. The 
complete set of explanatory variables is given in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
In order to evaluate the presence of economies of scale, the set includes the log of the number 
of inhabitants, the log of demographic density and their squared values.18 Among the several 
control variables included in equation (6), two financial indexes of municipality budget were 
                                                
18 Randall and DeEdgra (2009) stressed the importance of controling for population density when estimating 
municipal expenditure functions. The square log of population and density are introduced in order to allow some 
form of non-linearity. 
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considered: per capita national grants and per capita personal income (PIT) tax base. Other 
explanatory variables include many social, economic and territorial characteristics of the area. 
Tests confirm that municipalities’ expenditure behavior differs structurally depending on 
whether the number of inhabitants is fewer than 1,000, between 1,000 and 5,000, or more than 
5,000. Provincial capitals present a significantly different level of expenditure. 19 
Equation (6) was estimated with robust OLS using the stepwise technique, starting with the 
full set of 63 regressors and a constant.20 The results are given in Table 1. The majority of the 
coefficients are significant at 1%; the remaining ones are significant at 5%. The adjusted 2R  
is 0.76. All coefficients have the expected sign. 
The elasticity of per capita expenditure with respect to per capita grants is equal to 0.46, 
which implies that, evaluated at the average values, an increase in € 1 of per capita grants 
determines an increase in € 1.27 of per capita expenditure. The elasticity of expenditure with 
respect to per capita taxable income is 0.38 for municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants, but its value is approximately half that for small municipalities (elasticity is equal 
to 0.195). 
Entrepreneurial intensity, tourist capacity and the incidence of foreigners positively affect per 
capita expenditure in all municipalities. The only apparently contradictory result regards the 
effect of family size. The negative coefficient indicates that per capita expenditure decreases 
as long as the average number of components increases. However, this result seems 
reasonable considering the diffusion of single elderly families, who usually require more local 
services. 
Demographic density is quite relevant in explaining municipal expenditure. As expected, an 
increase in density determines a reduction in expenditure in all classes of municipalities, but 
the effect is higher for those with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. The altimetric zone 
determines a decrease in expenditure when passing from mountainous areas to flat areas for 
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. The effect is reversed, however, for small 
municipalities. 
                                                
19 The validity of the specification (6) was verified using Wald tests. First, we tested the null hypothesis that all 
43 coefficients kk γδααα ,,,, 321  are simultaneously zero. The resulting F statistic was F(43,517)=2.74, meaning 
that the hypothesis of equal coefficients for the entire sample can be rejected with a p-value<0.00001. The null 
hypotheses that coefficients kδα ,1  and kγα ,2  are simultaneously zero can be rejected, as we found 
F(21,517)=2.19 (p-value< 0.0018) and F(21,517)=2.12 (p-value< 0.0027), respectively. The t statistics for 3α  is 
-4.43 (p-value<0.00001). Although equation (6) was estimated using different values of population limits, 
coefficients did not yield statistically significant results. 
20 The significance level for removing a variable was set at 5%. 
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Migration and birth rates are relevant only for municipalities with fewer than 1,000 
inhabitants. The first variable negatively affects per capita expenditure, whereas higher birth 
rates determine an increase in expenditure. An interesting result is that, for this class of 
municipalities, belonging to a municipality association determines a reduction in expenditure.  
 
 
Table 1 – The estimated expenditure function  
Dependent variable: Municipalities’ per capita current expenditure (ln) 
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-test 
Constant 5.06985 4.08 ** 
ln population -0.89530 -4.95 ** 
(ln population)2 0.04967 5.17 ** 
ln population density -0.00738 -4.19 ** 
ln per capita total grants 0.45924 8.38 ** 
Entrepreneurial intensity 0.04020 6.81 ** 
ln per capita PIT tax base 0.37898 3.90 ** 
Tourism intensity 0.00128 6.71 ** 
ln average household size -0.86476 -5.63 ** 
Incidence of foreigners 0.00953 4.06 ** 
Altimetric zone -0.02578 -2.39 * 
d5 (dummy for 1,000< population≤ 5,000) -0.54654 -2.45 * 
Dummy for provincial capital -0.30256 -3.75 ** 
Interactions    
d1 ! ln population density 0.78273 3.24 ** 
d1 ! (ln population density)2 -0.11792 -3.35 ** 
d1 ! net migration rate -0.03302 -2.03 * 
d1 ! ln per capita PIT tax base -0.18438 -3.38 ** 
d1 ! ln municipalities association per capita expenditure -0.01913 -2.33 ** 
d1 ! ln birth rate 0.01825 2.28 * 
d1 ! altimetric zone 0.09804 3.08 ** 
d5 ! (ln population)2  0.00941 3.19 ** 
d5 ! (ln density)2 -0.00658 -2.38 * 
d5 ! altimetric zone 0.03817 2.97 ** 
Number of observations 581   
Adjusted R2 0.7631   
Standard error of the regression 0.1755   
F(22,558) 116.81   
Notes: Robust OLS results 
           ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
           * statistically significant at the 5% level 
           For a definition of the variables, see Table A.1 
 
 
 13 
4.3 Economies of scale and amalgamation effects 
Focusing on economies of scale and the distortions caused by fiscal rules, consider first how a 
standard municipality’s expected per capita expenditure varies with the number of inhabitants, 
whilst all other variables (including density) remain constant.21 In Figure 3 (I), point a 
represents a municipality with 500 inhabitants that have the average characteristics of 
municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants.22 The solid line shows how per capita 
expenditure of municipality a varies as population ranges from 0 to 5,000 inhabitants 
according to the estimated regression. When population reaches 1,000 inhabitants, there is 
discontinuity due to the structural break in fiscal and administrative rules. In contrast, the 
dotted line shows the expenditure trend if fiscal and administrative rules are kept constant. Let 
us consider the case in which the population of municipality a is tripled (from 500 to 1,500 
inhabitants). The estimated per capita expenditure is a” if the appropriate fiscal and 
administrative rules are considered, whereas it is a’ if fiscal and administrative rules are kept 
constant.  
This example shows that small municipalities may benefit from technical economies of scale 
(as expenditure decreases in passing from a to a’), but this effect is partially offset by tighter 
fiscal and administrative rules, determining institutional diseconomies (as expenditure 
increases from a’ to a”). 
Figure 3 (II) represents the effects of amalgamating municipality a (with 500 inhabitants) and 
municipality b (with 2,000 inhabitants). Each municipality lies in the region of the 
expenditure curve corresponding to the average characteristics of its class of population. The 
new municipality created by the amalgamation is represented by point c. As the new 
municipality is a weighted average of a and b, point c cannot lie in the expenditure curves 
drawn in Figure 3(II), because along those lines the socio-economic characteristics of the 
municipalities, except population, are held constant. In this example, the role of economies of 
scale is ambiguous, and b will not benefit from the amalgamation, since its ex-post per capita 
expenditure is higher than its ex-ante value. No voluntary amalgamation will occur in this 
case, while a compulsory amalgamation would be profitable if the total expenditure of c was 
lower than the total expenditures of a and b together. 
                                                
21 This corresponds to an amalgamation of municipalities that are equal in all respects apart from population. 
22 The term “average characteristics” means that the exogenous variables are set at the average values of all 
municipalities of that class. 
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Figure 3 – Scale and amalgamation effects 
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4.4 Amalgamation policy: criteria and constraints 
As shown in Figure 1, the first step of the proposed ex-ante assessment procedure is to define 
the amalgamation policy. Here, four possible different policies have been defined, the main 
characteristics of which are summarized in Table 2. Each policy is formalized by specifying 
three main aspects: 
1. the initial set of municipalities that could amalgamate,  
2. the constraints that need to be satisfied, 
3. the method used to choose which municipalities to amalgamate. 
The first two policies, A1 and A2, reflect the traditional approach to amalgamation, which is 
implemented exclusively on the basis of observable structural characteristics of 
municipalities. These policies are based on the consideration that population size and the 
associated economies of scale are the main drivers of amalgamations. In policy A1, 
municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants are forced to amalgamate with the smallest 
neighbor. In contrast, policy A2 considers the socio-economic characteristics of neighboring 
and small municipalities, which are forced to amalgamate with the most similar neighbor.23  
Moreover, we propose a second set of policies, B1 and B2, which instead look for the greatest 
economic efficiency. In this case, the initial set of potential amalgamations is formed by all 
possible pairs of neighboring municipalities. The best couple of municipalities to be 
amalgamated first is chosen as follows: 
                                                
23 The similarity is defined by means of the euclidean distance between two municipalities. The distance between 
municipality i and its neighbor j is ∑ = −= Kk ikjkikKij xxxd ,1
21 ]/)[( , where kx  are the following eleven 
variables: per capita current expenditure, population density, per capita grants, entrepreneurial intensity, per 
capita PIT tax base, tourism intensity, average household size, incidence of foreigners, altimetric zone, net 
migration rate, birth rate. The term ikx  is the mean value of variable k among all neighbors of municipality i. 
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a) Policy B1 considers the amalgamation which maximizes the expenditure reduction, 
without any dimensional constraint; 
b) Policy B2 is based on the assumption that the amalgamation is more acceptable for the 
municipalities involved if, for both municipalities i and j, there is a reduction of ex-post per 
capita expenditure, i.e. if iij EE ˆˆ <  and jij EE ˆˆ < .
24 Among all possible pairs of neighboring 
municipalities that satisfy the above conditions, the criterion chooses the amalgamation with 
the maximum average per capita expenditure saving: )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ 2121 ijjijiij EEEEEd −+−= . 
 
Table 2 – Amalgamation policies 
 Policies A1 A2 B1 B2 
Starting point The smallest municipality All possible pairs of amalgamations (initially 1,644 pairs) 
Population size 
constraint <5,000 <5,000 - - 
Financial 
constraint - - 
Positive aggregate 
expenditure 
reduction: 
ijS  
Positive expenditure 
reduction for both 
municipalities:
0ˆˆ >− iji EE , 0ˆˆ >− ijj EE  
Territorial 
constraint 
a) No amalgamation between adjoining municipalities belonging to different mountain 
valleys 
b) No limitations if municipalities are separated by rivers or belong to different 
provinces 
Method  
of choice 
The smallest municipality is 
amalgamated with: The amalgamation chosen is that with: 
The smallest 
neighbor 
The most similar 
neighbor 
Maximum 
aggregate 
expenditure 
reduction: 
max ijS  
Maximum average 
expenditure saving: 
max 
ijEd ˆ  
 
 
5. Results and sensitivity analysis 
5.1 Basic results 
The financial and administrative effects of the four amalgamation policies simulated are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Total annual expenditure reduction TS , varies from a 
minimum of € 24,377 million per year if policy A2 is adopted to a maximum of € 48,489 
million if policy B1 is used. This means a reduction in total expenditure ranging from -0.67% 
                                                
24 Note that this criterion is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for realizing a voluntary amalgamation, 
which depends on local preferences about private and public goods and on cultural and political affinity. 
However, it signals cases where there is a reciprocal economic gain. 
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in the first case to -1.33% in the second case. However, higher effects are expected for 
municipalities involved in amalgamations: policy A2 generates a 2.33% reduction in total 
expenditure for amalgamated municipalities, whereas policy B2 leads to amalgamated 
municipalities benefitting from a saving of 8.28%. Note that although policy B2 leads to a 
smaller expenditure reduction in absolute terms than policies A1 and B1, it is a more 
interesting policy for local administrations forced to amalgamate because they have the 
highest percentage gain (8.28%) and the highest level of per capita expenditure reduction (€ 
50.0). 
The lowest total expenditure reductions occur when policies A2 and B2 are used, because they 
strongly reflect local interests. The first policy explicitly takes into account local preferences 
(the most similar municipalities are amalgamated); the second policy requires that all 
amalgamated municipalities enjoy a reduction in per capita expenditure compared with the 
ex-ante situation. Instead, the greatest impact occurs when the explicit goal is to maximize 
total expenditure reduction without constraints, as in B1. 
Quite surprisingly, when amalgamations are based on the simple rule that smallest 
municipalities must be consolidated first (policy A1), the second highest total expenditure 
reduction is achieved: € 40.6 million (6.11% reduction in total expenditure for amalgamated 
municipalities). 
The reliability of the results was assessed by computing the 95% confidence intervals of 
expected total expenditure reduction (see Table 3).25 The confidence intervals are sufficiently 
low to validate the general conclusions made in the study. Policy A2 has the highest forecast 
error (±38% of the expected value); policy B2 has a forecast error of only ±9%.  
The effects of the structural reform considered here are not uniformly distributed among 
municipalities. The last part of Table 3 shows the distribution of new municipalities for the 
percentage variation of classes of expenditure. Amalgamations pursuing policies A1 and A2 
result in 13 and 25 new municipalities with a negative expenditure reduction, respectively. In 
contrast, none of the new municipalities have negative reductions under policies B1 and B2. 
Some new municipalities present a relevant percentage of expenditure reduction. When policy 
B2 is applied, 38 new municipalities (50% of new municipalities) achieve a percentage 
expenditure reduction exceeding 10%.  
                                                
25 We computed the standard errors of the expenditure forecast of each amalgamation and then performed a 
Montecarlo simulation to obtain the confidence interval of the total expenditure reduction TS . 
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The financial impact of policies can also be assessed considering the total present value of the 
annual expenditure reduction. Considering a period of 20 years and a 3% discount rate, the 
resulting figures (Table 3) are almost fifteen times greater than the annual expenditure 
reduction. For policies with the greatest expenditure reduction, A1 and B1, the present values 
are € 605.3 million and € 721.3 million, respectively. These amounts seem to be sufficiently 
high to offset any possible transitional costs, incurred only once, and confirm the viability of 
the amalgamation plan.  
The administrative effects of the four policies differ considerably (see Table 4). The number 
of new municipalities ranges from a minimum of 76 with policy B2 to a maximum of 130 
with policy A2. Symmetrically, the number of inhabitants involved in amalgamations range 
from a minimum of 617,655 (12.5% of the total population) with policy B2 to a maximum of 
1,618,067 (32.8%) with policy A2. 
The total number of municipalities decreases (-43.9% with A2 and -19.3 with B2) while the 
average population size of municipalities increases considerably in all cases. In particular, 
with policy A2 the average number of inhabitants rises to 15,146, with a 78.2% increase 
compared to the ex-ante situation. 
These results demonstrate that a small population size is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for a convenient amalgamation. In particular, if policies B1 and B2 are 
implemented, 11 and 28 municipalities, respectively, with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants are 
not involved in amalgamations. In contrast, a number of amalgamations involve only 
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, demonstrating that such municipalities can 
benefit from amalgamation. 
Figure 4 depicts the spatial effects of the four amalgamation policies in a map of 
municipalities of the Veneto Region. The new municipalities created by amalgamation can be 
identified by looking at neighboring municipalities with the same color. 
It is interesting to note that, under policy A1, based on population size only, a large number of 
amalgamated municipalities are located in the upper part of the map (the northern part of the 
Region) where municipalities are small and located in mountainous areas. Policy B1, on the 
other hand, excludes some of these municipalities from efficient amalgamations. With policy 
B2, municipalities in mountainous areas are almost absent because it is difficult in these cases 
to determine any mutual benefit of amalgamating. 
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Table 3 – Veneto Region: financial effects of compulsory amalgamations 
 
Present 
situation 
(year 2010) 
Amalgamation policies 
A1 A2 B1 B2 
Current expenditure (k€) 3,639,036 3,598,348 3,614,659 3,590,547 3,608,125 
Expenditure reduction due to 
amalgamations (k€)  40,687 24,377 48,489 30,910 
            95% confidence interval (k€) Min. 34,723 15,229 41,279 28,124 Max. 46,767 33,743 55,798 33,720 
Expenditure reduction/total expenditure 
(%)  1.12% 0.67% 1.33% 0.85% 
Present expenditure by amalgamated 
municipalities (k€)  666,080 1,046,522 699,423 373,266 
Expenditure reduction/expenditure of 
amalgamated municipalities (%)  6.11% 2.33% 6.93% 8.28% 
Average annual per capita expenditure 
reduction (€)  41.1 15.2 47.1 50.0 
Average annual expenditure reduction in 
new amalgamations (€)  360,063 187,512 448,969 406,711 
Present value of expenditure reduction (20 
years, at 3%) (k€) 
 605,322 362,661 721,389 459,863 
Distribution of new municipalities 
Percentage expenditure reduction (pr) Number of municipalities 
pr <= -2.5%  3 5 0 0 
-2.5% < pr <= 0.0%  10 20 0 0 
0.0% < pr <= 2.5%  19 43 25 12 
2.5% < pr <= 5.0%  17 23 21 10 
5.0% < pr <= 7.5%  14 12 18 8 
7.5% < pr <= 10.0%  13 5 14 8 
10.0% < pr <= 15.0%  34 21 26 33 
15.0% < pr <= 20.0%  3 1 3 4 
20% > pr  0 0 1 1 
Total  113 130 108 76 
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Table 4 – Veneto Region: administrative effects of compulsory amalgamations 
 
Present 
situation 
(year 2010) 
Amalgamation policies 
A1 A2 B1 B2 
Number of municipalities 
Total 581 352 326 377 469 
Reduction of municipalities   229 255 204 112 
% reduction  39.4% 43.9% 35.1% 19.3% 
Involved in amalgamations  342 385 312 188 
% involved  58.9% 66.3% 53.7% 32.4% 
New municipalities  113 130 108 76 
New municipalities as a % of ex-post 
total  32.1% 39.9% 28.6% 16.2% 
Average number in amalgamations  3.03 2.96 2.89 2.47 
Population 
Total 4,937,854     
Involved in amalgamations  989,211 1,618,067 1,029,235 617,655 
Involved/total (%)  20.0% 32.8% 20.8% 12.5% 
Average population in new 
municipalities  8,754.1 12,446.7 9,530.0 8,127.0 
Average population of total 
municipalities 8,498.9 14,028.0 15,146.8 13,097.8 10,528.5 
Increase with respect to present  65.1% 78.2% 54.1% 23.9% 
Distribution of municipalities 
Inhabitants Number of municipalities 
Fewer than 1000 40 0 0 11 28 
1,000–4,999 273 0 0 46 117 
5,000–9,999 137 189 153 151 175 
10,000–19,999 94 126 132 130 112 
20,000–49,000 30 30 34 32 30 
More than 50,000 7 7 7 7 7 
Total 581 352 326 377 469 
Distribution of new municipalities 
Inhabitants Number of municipalities 
Fewer than 1000  0 0 2 1 
1,000–4,999  0 0 5 2 
5,000–9,999  80 58 58 55 
10,000–19,999  33 59 41 18 
20,000–49,000  0 12 2 0 
More than 50,000  0 1 0 0 
Total  113 130 108 76 
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Figure 4 – Maps of simulated amalgamations in the Veneto Region 
 
 
Note: New municipalities created by amalgamations can be identified by looking at neighboring municipalities 
with the same color. 
 
 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis: population size constraint 
The effects of policies A1 and A2 depend also on the population constraint that limits 
amalgamation to municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Table 5 shows a simulation 
analysis conducted by varying the population constraint from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. In 
both policies A1 and A2, a higher population limit leads to a smaller number of municipalities, 
but the maximum expenditure reduction occurs at 5,000 inhabitants. In any case there is a 
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considerable expenditure reduction when the threshold is higher than 3,000 inhabitants with 
policy A1 and lower than 6,000 with policy A2. It is worth noting that in some cases, 
especially with policy A2, there is a negative expenditure reduction (i.e. an increase in 
expenditure). This fact suggests that the population level constraint should be chosen 
carefully. 
 
Table 5 – Veneto Region: expenditure reduction with different population constraints in 
amalgamation policies A1 and A2 
 Amalgamation policies 
 Policy A1 Policy A2 
Population 
constraint 
Number of 
municipalities 
Expenditure 
reduction (k€) 
Number of 
municipalities 
Expenditure 
reduction (k€) 
1,000 546 789 541 497 
2,000 495 -568 484 1,863 
3,000 443 8,656 416 12,423 
4,000 398 25,569 369 20,993 
5,000 352 40,687 326 24,376 
6,000 328 38,780 299 19,057 
7,000 298 33,344 263 -1,190 
8,000 274 26,880 238 -13,316 
9,000 256 20,398 221 -25,102 
10,000 256 20,398 209 -34,031 
 
5.3 Sensitivity of results with respect to the expenditure function specification 
In order to evaluate how the results are affected by the model specification, a simplified 
version of the expenditure function was estimated. This model, based on the naive idea that 
municipal per capita expenditure depends on population size only, was used to compute the 
fitted line shown in Figure 2. The estimation results yield a low adjusted 2R  (0.32), as shown 
in Table A.3. 
The financial impacts of the four amalgamation policies estimated using the simplified 
expenditure function are given in Table 6. Regardless of the amalgamation policy used, the 
expected expenditure reduction is almost double that in the previous case, although the 
ranking among policies remains the same. The minimum expected gain is realized with policy 
A2 (€ 52 million); the maximum effect occurs if policy B2 is implemented (€ 79 million).  
These results are important because they highlight the fact that expenditure function 
specification represents a crucial step towards an ex-ante assessment of amalgamation 
policies. The expected expenditure reduction is highly sensitive to different specifications and 
estimates of the municipal expenditure function.  
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Table 6 – Veneto Region: the financial effects of compulsory amalgamation policies 
using the simplified expenditure function 
 Present situation 
Amalgamation policies 
A1 A2 B1 B2 
Current expenditure (k€) 3,639,036 3,562,961 3,586,277 3,559,814 3,561,419 
Expenditure reduction from amalgamations 
(k€)  76,075 52,758 79,222 77,617 
Expenditure reduction/total expenditures 
(%)  2.09% 1.45% 2.18% 2.13% 
Present expenditure by amalgamated 
municipalities (k€)  666,080 1,046,522 797,348 780,446 
Expenditure reduction/expenditure of 
amalgamated municipalities (%)  11.42% 5.04% 9.94% 9.95% 
Average annual per capita expenditure 
reduction in amalgamated municipalities (€)  76.9 32.6 63.7 64.3 
Average annual expenditure reduction in 
new amalgamations (€)  222,441 137,034 207,387 206,428 
Present value of expenditure reduction (20 
years, at 3%) (k€)  1,131,802 784,907 1,178,622 1,154,742 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Amalgamation policies are usually based on the hypothesis that small municipalities provide 
local public services inefficiently, meaning that they should be encouraged or forced to merge 
in order to exploit economies of scale. Voluntary amalgamations would allow better results 
than compulsory amalgamations, but are difficult to achieve because the desire to maintain 
local identity often prevails.  
Most of the economic literature focuses on the effects of past municipal amalgamation 
programs. However, the results of those studies are of little use because they are case specific. 
The aim of this paper was to provide a tool for policy makers to estimate ex ante the expected 
financial and administrative effect of any compulsory amalgamation policy. 
An iterative procedure was developed to achieve this. It explicitly considers the spatial 
relationships between municipalities and the aggregation criteria adopted by policy makers, 
which requires the formalization of a number of constraints and objective functions.  
Implementation of the proposed method requires the initial estimation of an expenditure 
function of the municipalities, as this allows the expected expenditure of an amalgamation to 
be defined. 
The proposed approach also provides local administrators with quantitative information about 
the possible financial outcomes of a voluntary amalgamation of municipalities.  
 23 
Applying the model to a case study, the municipalities of an Italian Region, the effects of a 
general compulsory amalgamation program was assessed on the basis of four alternative 
policies that differ in terms of constraints and goals. The results obtained support the idea that 
the highest expenditure reduction is not obtained when municipalities are aggregated solely 
on the basis of population size, but when expenditure reduction maximization is explicitly 
introduced into the amalgamation selection. The case study also reveals the presence of 
institutional economies and diseconomies of scale, which partially offset technical economies 
of scale.  
The results are sensitive to different specifications and estimates of the expenditure function, 
which represents the crucial step for any ex-ante amalgamation program assessment. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 – Municipal variables used in estimation 
 Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Per capita current expenditure € 665.05 313.18 283.09 2846.79 
2 Population Inhabitants in 2010 8498.89 19687.12 127 270,884 
3 Population density Inhabitants/land area (ha) 293.02 276.85 5.72 2306.93 
4 Per capita grants € 239.66 94.88 104.30 901.49 
5 Entrepreneurial intensity Firms/inhabitants (!100) 7.33 1.80 1.48 19.08 
6 Per capita PIT tax base € 11659.82 1565.65 5054.04 21265.63 
7 Tourism intensity Beds/inhabitants (!100) 19.37 65.85 0.00 681.42 
8 Average household size  2.52 0.20 1.52 2.98 
9 Incidence of foreigners Foreigners/inhabitants (!100) 8.26 3.95 0.47 20.77 
10 Altimetric zone 
1 = Internal mountain 
2 = Coastal mountain 
3 = Internal hill 
4 = Coastal hill 
5 = Flat 
3.78 1.60 1 5 
11 Net migration rate 
Net 
migration/inhabitants 
(!100) 
0.27 0.75 -2.21 5.04 
12 Birth rate Births/inhabitants (!1000) 9.36 2.12 0.00 14.98 
13 Municipal associations’ per capita current expenditure € 18.38 51.88 0.00 385.45 
14 Per capita exogenous tax revenues € 34.90 9.89 14.29 184.70 
15 Young-age-dependency ratio 
Population aged 0-14/ 
population aged 15-64 
(!100) 
21.83 2.96 11.35 29.66 
16 Old-age-dependency ratio 
Persons aged 65 and 
over/population aged 
15-64 (!100) 
30.72 6.80 14.97 64.41 
17 Jobs per inhabitant Total jobs/inhabitants (!100) 29.20 17.26 2.58 197.90 
18 Mortality rate Deaths/inhabitants (!1000) 9.36 3.34 3.09 35.18 
19 
Mountain municipal 
associations’ per capita 
expenditure  
€ 26.10 78.31 0 485.11 
20 Dummy d1 
1 if inh.≤ 1,000 
0 otherwise 0.069 0.253 0 1 
21 Dummy d5 
1 if 1000< inh.≤ 5000 
0 otherwise 0.470 0.500 0 1 
22 Dummy prov 1 if provincial capital 0 otherwise 0.012 0.109 0 1 
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Table A.2 – Distribution of inhabitants and current expenditure for Veneto Region 
municipalities (2010) 
Classes 
(inhabitants) 
Number of 
municipalities % Inhabitants % 
Current 
expenditure       
(euro x 1,000) 
% 
< 500 10 1.72 3,252 0.07 4,730.3 0.13 
500–999 30 5.16 22,826 0.46 21,881.9 0.60 
1,000–1,999 74 12.74 114,452 2.32 89,130.3 2.45 
2,000–2,999 83 14.29 207,370 4.20 144,439.1 3.97 
3,000–4,999 116 19.97 456,376 9.24 289,239.8 7.95 
5,000–9,999 137 23.58 987,082 19.99 514,616.5 14.14 
10,000–19,999 94 16.18 1,255,678 25.43 711,057.8 19.54 
20,000–49,999 32 5.51 943,038 19.10 617,290.4 16.96 
50,000–99,999 1 0.17 82,807 1.68 67,299.3 1.85 
> 100,000 4 0.69 864,973 17.52 1,179,350.2 32.41 
Total 581 100.00 4,937,854 100.00 3,639,035.5 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3 – Simplified municipal expenditure function 
Dependent variable: Municipal per capita current expenditure (ln) 
Explanatory variables coefficient t-test 
Constant 13.59296 26.24 ** 
ln population -1.58574 -13.37 ** 
(ln population)2 0.08595 12.76 ** 
Number of observations 581  
Adjusted R2 0.3198  
Standard error of the regression 0.2973  
F(2,578) 107.280  
Note: ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
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